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Explaining the dearth of FDI in the Middle East   
                          Sarkis Joseph Khoury, and Eva Wagner 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of an empirical model to explain foreign direct investment (or the lack 
thereof) in MENA countries. A brief review of the literature on FDI is presented. Testable hypotheses are 
drawn from the theory of internalization, the transportation theory and the new institutional economics 
theory. These theories allow for the identification of a series of independent variables to test using panel 
data on MENA countries. The paper develops rigorous statistical tests using the latest available data to 
explain the low level of FDI flows into MENA countries. Data constraints and consistency forced the 
selection of only nine countries (out of 22). The regression results using data covering 1984-2006 show 
strong evidence that economic, social and political variables influence FDI flows into MENA countries. 
These results contradict a large number of previous studies specifically targeted to MENA countries, and 
confirm some of the results of broader studies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The economic ‘miracles’ of China and India are consuming huge intellectual capital as economists 
attempt to explain why and how they metamorphosed. Everyone agrees that Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) played a major role in their economic growth, but there is less than unanimity about the long-term 
effects of FDI flows, and the sustainability and the stability of the growth they have generated. Countries 
that have not received ‘their fair share’ from the huge investment flows to developed, and developing 
countries are left wondering why. This paper attempts to find the answers and proposes some policy 
options to countries that are failing in the FDI competition. 
 The size of FDI flows in the world is staggering.  The World Bank data shows that while the focus 
is on developing countries, the lion share of FDI flows to developed countries, and mostly to China in the 
developing world.  
 FDI in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been the lowest in the world (Table 1) and 
it appears to have yielded very few of the expected positive externalities. Important efforts continue to be 
made to attract FDI in most countries of the MENA region through, for example, the creation of 
investment zones and investment promotion agencies, and the provision of special incentives and tax 
breaks. FDI is generally considered a desirable mean for ushering in resources – capital, technology, 
human capital and other factors – that can facilitate the higher levels of productivity necessary for 
economic development. FDI is also considered preferable to portfolio investment because it is typically 
more long-term, less volatile source of capital. Considerable research, however, shows that FDI is 
preferred to foreign aid (Trevino and Upadhyaya 2003) and has had a positive impact on host countries 
(Trevino, Daniels and Arbelaez 2002). 
FDI flows, as Table 1 shows have their own cycles. They rose markedly in the late 1990’s only to 
fall precipitously in 2001, and 2002. The flows did not reverse direction until 2004 when they rose by 
almost 30%. The growth continued at this rapid pace and is expected to reach $1,475 billion in 2007 and 
$1,604 in 2011 according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. The flows to MENA countries accounted for 
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4.65% and 5.13% of the total FDI flows in 2005 and 2006, respectively despite many of the incentives 
offered by those countries.  
 MENA countries have created institutions to seek greenfield investments which, on average, offer 
lower risk diversification and require larger financial commitments in a region where business and 
political risk are perceived as higher than average. This is so at a time when the majority of global FDI is 
driven by M&A transactions.     
  This paper argues that higher levels of investment can be generated in MENA countries through 
fundamental political, social, and economic reforms that increase human capital, production and 
marketing capabilities, and lower corruption. There is a well-developed literature on these factors 
classified as the Institutional Theory of FDI (see Grosse and Trevino 2005). 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, 19. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF FDI  
The first large players in FDI where Britain in the 19th century, then the United States, Britain and 
Japan in the 20th century.  FDI became more important on a global scale after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
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1989 and the economic openness in China and India. It expanded to new locations and new sectors such as 
electronics, small computers and air transport, as well as the infrastructure relevant to these sectors.   
FDI in MENA countries is peculiar in many ways and is of marginal size and impact (especially 
outside the pervasive oil sector) when compared with the rest of the world, Asia especially. It is 
characterized by four main features (Eid and Fiona 2003): first, FDI flows into MENA countries have not 
kept pace with flows to the rest of the world, resulting in lower average stocks, as they have been lower 
than the average for all other regions of the world.  Second, most FDI flows have gone only to a handful 
of countries, and have been concentrated in a few sectors with limited investment scope because they are 
publicly owned, and typically low in productive employment generation.  What has not gone to the public 
sector has been episodic or mostly connected with one-time privatization waves.  The third feature is that 
FDI stocks and flows have constituted a small part of the region’s economies both in terms of gross fixed 
capital formation and gross domestic product.  The fourth feature might be the only piece of good news; 
intra-Arab investment comprises a significant proportion of FDI inflows to countries in the region, and is 
likely to be underestimated in international financial statistics.   
        Some argued that the lack of integration of MENA capital markets in the world financial system may 
have contributed to low FDI in MENA countries. There are practically no Arab companies listed on the 
NASDAQ, while there are at least two hundred Israeli companies so listed. There is not an integrated 
stock market for the Arab world.  An attempt to create one through an entity in Dubai has thus far failed.    
The second feature, which partly explains the first, has been slow growth, and the strong 
dependence of the MENA economies on the price of oil. According to UNCTAD data, during the period 
extending from 1990 to 2004, the average annual GDP growth rate for the region was of 5.28 percent, and 
this was mainly driven by the price of oil for the period.  In terms of GDP per capita, the region 
experienced close to 1.5 percent growth (World Development Indicators) as the population growth rate 
averaged 2.2% from 1990 to 2003 (World Development Indicators). The phenomenal increase in the price 
of oil in 2006-2008 has significantly increased economic growth, but doubts linger about the stability of 
that growth and the way the funds are being used. It appears that the allocation of oil funds is much wiser 
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now than after the first oil embargo of the 1970’s. Debt is being retired, new companies are being formed, 
intelligent international acquisitions by MENA countries and institutions are consummated, and serious 
attention is being paid to develop human capital that is internationally competitive. 
This paper attempts to explain why MENA countries have failed to attract greenfield FDI flows. A 
set of hypotheses are developed based on sound, existing theories that have found market acceptance. We 
begin with a brief literature review of FDI theories and the testable hypotheses that flow from them.   
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON FDI: RELEVANCE TO FDI IN MENA COUNTRIES 
The literature on FDI theories (also look at Appendix B to get a more recent review of the 
literature) may well contain the seeds of an explanation of why MNC’s are shunning the MENA market as 
a place for either greenfield investments or cross border acquisitions. 
The original literature on FDI carried the Profit maximization hypothesis to an international 
dimension and argued that highly profitable firms invest overseas in order to reduce the cost of supplying 
their products in the foreign market (Horst 1971).  Hymer (1976), and Kindleberger (1970) argued that the 
theory of FDI belonged to the theory of industrial organization.  Firms that invest overseas must possess a 
market power or a special advantage in order to cover the additional cost of operating at a distance, 
political risk, risk of expropriation, inflation risk, etc. The conditions for Hymer’s theory were presented 
by R.Caves (1971). The firm must have internalized a public good the opportunity cost of which ‘is not 
necessarily zero’. The return on assets overseas ‘must depend at least somewhat on local production’.  
An oligopolistic market structure in the home market (imperfections in the markets for products, 
factors of production, and financial assets) will encourage a firm to go overseas in order to capture a 
monopolistic profit. But not all markets are equally hospitable and desirable. Later research by Neary 
(2004) showed the importance of this driver, especially for cross border acquisitions. It influences not only 
on the investment decision, but the mode of entry as well. This theory was able to explain both vertical as 
well as horizontal investments.  
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Khoury (1980) showed conclusively that risk diversification as a strong motivator of FDI, 
especially in the service sector. But, diversification is not a blind rule, as it does not include any and all 
assets regardless of their risk profile and their payoff function. One must decide on the acceptable 
members of the population (sample) before the selection process begins in earnest. This may exclude 
certain sectors or certain countries, or even entire regions. When country risk and political risk are mixed 
in the equation, MENA countries become acutely disadvantaged as they suffer from lack of democracy, 
few brutal dictatorships, and are seriously destabilized by threats of terror and by the ever distant peace in 
the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians.   
 These theories deal with “PUSH” factors of FDI: those factors that have encouraged (pushed) 
MNC’s to seek opportunities in overseas markets.  A prominent theory in the PUSH domain is that of 
internalization found mostly in the work of Rugman (1980). The fecundity of Rugman’s work is hard to 
summarize in this paper. He attempted a summary with Verbeke (Rugman and Verbeke 2008). We draw 
several testable hypotheses from such a summary.  In general, the theory argues that MNC’s are capable 
of privatizing (internalizing), and thus capitalizing, on what otherwise is a public good. They have, 
therefore, a competitive advantage over companies in the host countries. That advantage compensates for 
the relative disadvantages of operating at a distance in a foreign land which culture and systems they do 
not understand. Rugman, and several others (Buckley 1979, Buckley and Casson 1981) documented 
several mechanisms for internalization. Porter’s diamond offered its own set of PUSH factors discussed 
below. Other macro variables, such as exchange rates, have also explained FDI.  Much of the Japanese 
FDI in the US during the 1980’s was due to the overvalued yen, for example. 
More recent literature on FDI “PULL” factors has streamlined the motives for FDI. They include: 
 1- Market seekers- FDI is warranted by the size of the host market and by the possibility of using 
it as a base for exports. The size of the Arab markets are not very large, as the largest countries in terms of 
population, Egypt and Sudan, are quite poor and their labor markets are quite fragmented. There are high 
wealth, high consumption countries to be sure such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Gulf states. Their 
potential is very dependent on oil prices and the size of their populations is small. Furthermore, it was not 
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until 2004 that attempts at integrating the Arab countries in trade terms succeeded under the tutelage of the 
Arab League. The ‘Arab Free Trade zone’ was inaugurated on January 1, 2005.  The full implementation 
of the zone has to occur within 7 years. Unfortunately, no truly common market exists for all Arab 
countries as of 2008.  To the extent that tariffs and other impediments to trade were reduced, it was 
because of external factors such as joining the WTO. Western oil companies operating in the Middle East 
invested in oil producing countries (oil exploration, extraction, refining, etc.) in order to export to the 
home country and to other countries. They had a comparative advantage in the necessary technology for 
getting the oil from the ground to markets all over the world (Grosse 2005). The recent jump in economic 
growth in MENA countries could explain some of the interest of foreign investors.    
     2- Raw materials seekers- Here oil is a prime example.  This accounts for a major share of FDI in 
the Arab world. This is also reflected, unfortunately, in the fact that most Arab exports are oil driven and 
there are very little manufactured goods in the mix.  The combined exports of all Arab countries that are 
not oil related do not much exceed those of Finland – a country of about 6 million citizens. MENA 
countries have little or no tariffs and enjoy large two-way trades. The openness of their economies could 
explain FDI flows. 
 3- Production efficiency seekers- Here the host country must have factors of productions that are 
underpriced in relation to their productivity. The Arab world has very fragmented markets that invariably 
exclude women. The work ‘ethics’ are not competitive with those in Asia and other locations.  In Saudi 
Arabia, half the population, almost, is outside the labor market. The country is almost completely reliant 
on its natural resources and largely excludes women from the workforce. The country is a net importer of 
labor. There are not sufficient technical training courses in the Arab world and the internet is still 
minimally used.   
 4- Knowledge seekers- This type of FDI will not likely find its way to MENA countries. The 
infrastructure is lacking in almost all respects. There are almost no research institutes in the MENA 
countries that are producing basic research and the universities are largely teaching institutions. The 
technology base, to the extent it exists, is largely imported. Technical know how is spotty and it invariably 
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leaves the Middle East for Europe and the United States. The populations of MENA countries are users, 
not producers of technology in whatever forms it comes in. Many MENA countries are trying to change 
this reality and some are having limited success.                  
 5- Political safety seekers- this type of investment is clearly not relevant to MENA countries. 
Whatever ‘stability’ is apparent is not based on the will of the population. It is achieved, in some cases, 
through repressive means. Many significant and positive changes have occurred in this regard. This type 
flow is typically toward developed, rather than developing countries where the rule of law is paramount 
and property rights are fully protected. 
 6- Managerial and Marketing expertise- This may explain the flow of a limited amount of FDI 
into countries like Lebanon, only in so far as the available talent will be used to further the penetration in 
the MENA countries.  Advertising and management companies have found their ways to countries like 
Lebanon and Dubai.  The scale is limited, however. The outsourcing phenomenon that has been critical to 
the development of India could have been the foundation of economic development in Lebanon, for 
example, given the high level of education, the common use of the English language, and the body of 
expertise that is already in the country. Yet, this is overshadowed by a corrupt practices, very high 
taxation in many MENA countries, and extremely expensive infrastructure (especially communication and 
electricity). 
 7- Cultural issues- The presence of multicultural communities and ethnic enclaves in the US, e.g., 
explains why many foreign banks, for example, and the service sector in general, have decided to set up 
offices in the US.  This was documented in the case of banks by Khoury (1979) as well as by Grosse and 
Trevino (1996).  
 8- Institutional Factors- The Theory of new institutional economics was introduced by Williamson 
(2000). It argues that country governance (e.g. political stability) have considerable impact on FDI flows. 
The hypotheses that flow from this theory were successfully tested by Dikova and Witteloostuijn (2007).   
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 9- Special concessions to foreign companies offered by host countries: special tax provisions, 
interest free loans, job training programs, build to suit with long term mortgages, exemptions from certain 
regulations, free trade zones, etc.              
The above factors/conditions are accentuated by the intense competition among countries to 
attract foreign investment. This was summarized by Porter’s diamond.  The corners of the diamond are 
factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry. The factors of production include labor, capital, technology and increasingly knowledge assets 
from a well-educated workforce. The nature of the demand in the host market will influence the level and 
the intensity of the competition and will generate more efficient marketing, production, and quality control 
skills.  The presence of related industries will make for easier and cheaper manufacturing and the 
implementation of production methods such as just in time inventory etc. This is bound to add to the 
attractiveness of the host country. 
We must further point out that the implementation of an FDI strategy depends on many factors. 
FDI is broadly categorized under greenfield investments and cross-country M&A. The latter involves, 
largely, the acquisition of individual plants and divisions or even entire corporations. According to Nocke 
and Yeaple (2005), greenfield-type FDI is more likely to flow “from high wage into low wage countries”, 
and cross-border acquisitions are more likely “when factor price differences between countries are small”. 
They found that greenfield FDI is “systematically more efficient”.  This may explain the massive inflows 
into China and India. The M&A option for MENA countries is almost precluded when the ownership 
structure of Arab companies is examined. 
Corporate formation in the Arab world is still in its infancy as upward of 75% of economic 
activities in the Arab World is generated by family owned business. This reality restricts foreign direct 
investment as much of it (over 50 %) is in the form of M&A. 
Even when companies are publicly traded, acquisitions can still be very cumbersome indeed.  The 
total capitalization of all the companies listed on the stock markets of MENA countries is almost $1 
trillion. The number of firms is approximately 700. The top 5 and the top ten firms in these markets 
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dominate the capitalization of the market and are closely held, making their acquisition by foreign entities 
very difficult indeed (Table 2). Add to this the restrictive laws on acquisition by foreign entities that are 
pervasive in the Arab world and M&A becomes very daunting. 
   M&A is generally the result of wide gaps in entrepreneurial ability. Greenfield investments (also 
referred to as de Novo investments) seek differences in factor prices (among other things) given free trade 
is possible. It appears, therefore, that the Arab World would be well served through greenfield 
investments, initially. After achieving sufficient level of efficiency in the home markets and after a 
sufficient number of corporate entities is formed, M&A will follow greenfield investments. 
Table 2 
Country Top 10 Co’s as % Market cap To 5 Co’s as % of Market Cap 
UAE 
Tunisia 
Saudi Arabia 
Qatar 
Palestine 
Oman 
Morocco 
Lebanon 
Kuwait 
Jordan 
Egypt 
Bahrain 
66.9% 
66.6% 
73.6% 
83.9% 
96.7% 
73.4% 
76.8% 
98.7% 
47.1% 
76.9% 
71.2% 
90.7% 
49.6% 
46.4% 
58.5% 
62.9% 
91.4% 
60.1% 
60.4% 
84.7% 
32% 
69.9% 
59.4% 
74.0% 
Source: Different stock market data bases. 
The other factors that could influence the decision to invest in a foreign country are political: 
nature of the government, trade policies; social: role of women, individual rights, legal structures, 
xenophobia, corruption; economic: living standards, consumption patterns, etc.; the state of development 
of the indigenous financial markets, and natural conditions: weather patterns, etc. 
We now summarize studies that have specifically focused on FDI in MENA countries. The 
literature on FDI in MENA countries is relatively recent. A critical reader would find the results 
inconsistent, if not confusing. Some studies, for example, found corruption to have a negative effect on 
FDI flows, while another found exactly the opposite. There are few points of agreement across the papers, 
summarized in Table 3, however: The importance of economic growth (GDP growth) and of inflation is 
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largely supported. Economic openness, measured by size of trade as percent of GDP, is predominantly 
significant and, the degree of political instability or political risk seems to have explanatory power for FDI 
flows to MENA countries.  Many of the models applied in these studies are misspecified and/or used a 
poor data set, however. 
 
 
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES AND RELEVANT VARIABLES 
 
MENA countries as Divarci et al. (2005) argue are far from homogeneous, yet they exhibit 
common traits such as “…reliance on oil, weak economic base, high population growth and 
unemployment rates…”. Divarci et al. show that the Investment Development Path (IDP) theory advanced 
by Dunning (1981) does explain outward investment flows (referred to above as Push factors). It 
extension into the Eclectic Theory argues that FDI is motivated by three factors: “ownership, location and 
internalization (OLI)”.  
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Table 3 – Literature Review of FDI in the MENA region 
Author(s) (Year)/Paper  Methodology and Data Findings 
Kamaly (2002)/Evaluation of 
FDI Flows into the MENA 
Region 
Dynamic panel model, 1990-
1999.  
Economic growth (GDP 
growth) is the only significant 
determinant of FDI flows to 
the MENA region.  
Hassan (2003)/FDI, 
Information Technology and 
Economic Growth in the 
MENA Region 
Panel model (fixed effects) on 
95 countries and 8 MENA 
countries, 1980-2001 
Growth and FDI are related to 
macroeconomic, Information 
and communication 
technology and globalization 
(openness) variables. None of 
the economic factors are 
significant in explaining FDI 
in MENA countries. 
Onyeivwu (2003)/ Analysis of 
FDI Flows to Developing 
Countries: Is the MENA 
Region Different? 
OLS pooled pegressions and 
fixed-effects model, 51 
developing countries (10 from 
the MENA region), 1975-
1999. 
Some of the variables that 
influence FDI flows to 
developing countries are not 
important for flows to MENA 
countries, namely rate of 
return on investment 
(measured by log of the 
inverse of the real GDP per 
capita), infrastructure, 
economic growth, and 
inflation. Openness (trade) 
increases FDI flows to MENA 
countries.  Corruption is found 
to reduce flows to the region.  
Chan/Gemayel (2004)/Risk 
Instability and the Pattern of 
Foreign Direct Investment in 
the Middle East and North 
Africa Region 
Dynamic panel model (fixed 
and random effects), 19 
MENA countries  and 14 
member countries of the EU 
The instability of political risk, 
financial risk and economic 
indices (PRS Group) provide a 
better fit than the indices 
themselves when explaining 
the FDI flows to MENA. The 
degree of instability has a 
much stronger impact than risk 
itself.  
Lumbila (2005)/ What makes 
FDI work? A Panel Analysis 
of the Growth Effect of FDI in 
Africa  
Panel analysis (GLS), 47 
African countries for the 
period 1980-2000. 
Corruption does not matter in 
the case of FDI; FDI flows 
mostly to countries with 
attractive natural resources 
regardless of the perception of 
corruption and the goodness of 
the policy environment.  
Guetat (2006)/ The Effects of 
Corruption on Growth 
Performance of the MENA 
OLS regressions, 90 
countries, 1960-2000 
Corruption has a negative 
impact on MENA growth. It 
deters growth more 
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Countries significantly in MENA 
countries than in Latin 
American and other countries. 
Hisarciklilar et. al. (2006)/ 
Location Drivers of FDI in 
MENA Countries: A Spatial 
Attempt 
Panel model, fixed effects 
(ML estimation), 18 countries, 
1980-2001 
GDP has a significant impact 
on FDI. Trade is also 
significant. FDI in the MENA 
region are market oriented and 
not vertical. Fundamentals, not 
those much institutional 
constraints, are effective in 
explaining FDI flows. 
 
 
 
Kutan et. al. (2007)/Does 
corruption hurt economic 
development?: Evidence from 
Middle Eastern, North African 
and Latin American Countries 
Panel model, random and 
fixed effect models, 1993 -
2003. 
Higher levels of Corruption 
are related to higher levels of 
GDP per Capita. Corruption is 
associated with improved 
economic development in 
MENA countries.  It seems 
that corruption in MENA 
countries helps deal with red 
tape and other bureaucratic 
barriers in and creates an 
environment in which business 
can be run more effectively. 
Jallab et. al. (2008)/ Foreign 
Direct Investment, 
Macroeconomic Instability 
And Economic Growth in 
MENA Countries 
Dynamic panel, GMM, 1970-
2005, 11 MENA countries 
Paper aims to analyze the 
influence of FDI on economic 
growth in MENA countries. 
No independent impact of FDI 
on economic growth. The 
positive impact of FDI on 
economic growth depends on 
macroeconomic stability 
(inflation).  
 
The ownership advantage speaks of the differences between home and host country in terms of 
patents, know how, differential access to raw materials and to markets, etc. Internalization refers to the 
capacity of the firms to endogenize what otherwise are public goods and sell them on the international 
markets instead to other firms. Any market imperfection can lead to internalization. The location 
advantage deals with distance, differential in infrastructure costs, labor composition and wages, and the 
nature and stability of economic and political systems. Rugman and Verbeke (2008) argue that location 
factors capture the country effects, while internalization deals with firm-level strategy decisions. The old 
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view of FDI that it is motivated by differential rates of returns on capital is discounted. The OLI view 
leaves us with the following hypotheses: 
H1: Economic variables have an impact on FDI. The larger the GDP of host countries 
are, the larger the FDI flow. The higher the inflation, the lower the FDI flows. 
Buckley and Castro (1998) suggest a testable function where Net outward Investment is a function 
of GDP^3, and GDP^5, while Dunning and Narula (1996) suggested a quadratic function in GDP. The 
higher the GDP and or its growth rate, the more attractive the host country would be. We anticipate a 
positive relationship between FDI and GDP growth or GDP per capita growth and a negative one between 
FDI and inflation. 
H2: The higher the government regulations (tariffs, quotas, etc.) are, the more FDI 
would replace exports.  
Similarly, the more open the economy is (measured by trade as % of GDP), the higher FDI is as 
investing companies are likely to use those host countries as export platform. Most MENA countries, 
especially those with the highest GDP’s have minimum impediments to trade. We anticipate, therefore, a 
positive relationship between FDI and the trade variable.  
H3:   The higher the education level and the more liberal the host societies are, the more 
FDI will take place.  
Rugamn and Verbeke (2008), Rugman and Verbeke (2004), and Rugman (2005) argue that the 
above hypotheses when tested across all countries lead to a rich explanation as to why FDI takes place 
within the triad of “the EU, North America and Asia Pacific”.  They went on to say that “inter regional 
liability of foreigness exceeds the perceived benefits of globalization. The world’s largest firms appear to 
experience difficulties in adapting their business model across regions, whereas they are very successful 
with international expansion within their home region”.    
We use percent of female in the labor force as a proxy for educational liberalism in the labor 
supply pool.    
    More hypotheses based on the theory of new institutional economics are tested: 
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 H4:  The better the governance [political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, voice and accountability] of a host country are, the higher the FDI flows. 
The better the governance, the political stability and the democratic accountability, of a host 
country are, the higher the FDI flows.   
H5:   The greater the danger of external conflicts and violent external pressure (cross-
border conflicts to all-out war), the lower the FDI flows.  
Countries in regions characterized by conflict are less likely to attract FDI. 
             H6:  Higher corruption level has a negative effect on FDI. 
Many papers have struggled with the relationship between corruption and FDI. We were able to 
find reliable data and have indeed obtained robust results which contradict the results of Kutan et al. 
(2007).  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
We begin with a look at the data and the unique challenges they presented. 
Data  
Data for MENA countries are a serious problem for any researcher. There is no central clearing 
place, to include the Arab League. Even the UN, the World Bank and the IMF do not have the needed 
data. We were, therefore, obliged to buy data from private providers to supplement limited publicly 
available data. But this restricted us to a few countries and a small portion of the relevant variables. There 
was simply no way to include 22 MENA countries for the empirical analysis. We collected country-wise 
data over a period of 23 years, 1984-2006. Most of the variables we initially wanted to base our analysis 
on were simply not available, either country-wise or time-wise. This restricted our analysis to nine 
countries, namely – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Tunisia. 
Even for these countries a few data points were missing. Rather than omitting all these years and run into 
the problem of very low degrees of freedom, we decided to forecast for the missing values for each 
variable, for each country, based on the time trend. To avoid multicollinearity in the analysis, we restricted 
  16 
ourselves to seven proxies in our panel regression model. The entire process yielded a data set with nine 
countries for a period of 23 years, or 207 observations. 
 
Data Definition 
Dependent Variable. In this study, our dependent variable is FDI (net FDI as a percentage of GDP).  
Independent Variables. The independent variables are – according to our hypothesis 1-6 – the following:  
(1) GDPCG – GDP per capita growth – is expected to be positively correlated with FDI flows.   
(2) INFL – Inflation – is assessed with the annual percentage change of consumer prices. We expect 
to find negative effects of inflation rate. 
(3)  TRADE - Openness to international trade is captured by the ratio of the sum of exports plus 
imports to total output (GDP). According to the previous theoretical and empirical considerations, 
we expect a positive relationship. 
(4)  LABFE – labor force, female (% of total labor force). We expect a positive relationship. 
The following four measures are from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), provided by the PRS 
Group. The indicators are widely used as high-quality measures of political risk. For a detailed description 
of how these variables have been calculated go to www.prsgroup.com. 
(5) DEMO – relates to the democratic accountability of the government. According to the PRS Group 
it measures how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, 
the more likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly 
violently in a non-democratic one. The indicator is assessed on a scale from 0 to 6, with higher 
values indicating more democracy. A positive relationship can be expected. 
(6) CONFL – weights external conflict; is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent 
government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic 
pressures, trade restrictions, sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (cross-border conflicts to 
all-out war).  The subcomponents are: war, cross-border conflict, foreign pressures.  The indicator 
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is assessed on a scale from 0 to 12, with higher values indicating less risk for external conflicts. 
We would expect this indicator to be positively related to FDI flows.  
(7) CORRTAR3– According to the PRS Group corruption is an assessment of corruption within the 
political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment: it distors the economic and 
financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to 
assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; it introduces an inherent 
instability into the political process. The corruption variable is one that represents an inverted 
scale (0 for the most corrupt and 6 for the least corrupt). We assume that most foreign direct 
investors grow intolerant of corruption when it crosses the 3 level.  We have subtracted all the 
MENA corruption data from 3 and, as expected, they invariably (in fact: almost all!) fell below 3: 
MENA governments are corrupt. We anticipated, therefore, that the relationship between high 
corruption (a high tax for doing business in the host country) and FDI should be negative. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the data definition and shows the sources as well as the expected signs of the 
coefficients.  
Table 4: Summary of variables, definition, data sources as well as expected signs  
Variable Definition Source Expected Sign of 
the Coefficients 
FDI  Foreign direct investment, 
net inflows (% of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI Online 2008)  
GDPCG   GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) 
World Bank (WDI Online 2008) + 
INFL  Inflation, Percentage change 
in the GDP deflator or 
consumer price index 
 World Bank (WDI Online 2008) - 
TRADE   Ratio of sum of exports and 
import to GDP 
World Bank (WDI Online 2008) + 
LABFE   Labor force, female (% of 
total labor force) 
 World Bank (WDI Online 2008) + 
 
DEMO   Democratic accountability, 0-
6 scale 
PRS Group + 
CONFL External conflict, 0-12 scale PRS Group + 
 
CORRTAR3 Corruption, 0-6 scale, 
“intolerance level 3” 
PRS Group - 
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Some descriptive statistics and correlation among the variables are presented in the Appendix A. 
Econometric Model 
Panel data for nine MENA countries for the period 1984 to 2006 was used to explain 
some of the determinants of FDI in this region. The empirical assessment is based on the basic model 
given by Equation (1). 
 
FDIit  = α + αi + ß1 GDPCG it-1  + ß2 INFL it-1  + ß3 TRADE it-1  + ß4 LABFE it-1  + ß5 DEMO it-1  
 + ß6 CONFL it-1 + ß7 CORRTAR3 it-1  +  εit  (i = 1,2, ….,9) and   (t = 1,2,…23)                 (1) 
where subscript i refers to countries, t refers to years from 1984 to 2006, α is the intercept, αi 
captures the country-specific fixed effect, and εit is an error term. All independent variables are lagged by 
one year to control for the possible reciprocal effects of FDI inflows. 
We used several estimation methods. First, we applied pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), with 
fixed-effects at the country level.i  From a theoretical point, treating the countries as homogeneous is too 
restrictive, however (oil-rich economies, labor-abundant countries, poor in resources like Egypt, Morocco, 
Jordan or Tunisia and Sudan). Including country effects captures the unobserved country-specific 
variation in a country-specific intercept. In Table 5, column (1) we report the coefficient estimation for the 
basic equation with a one-year lag on all independent variables.   
In order to ensure a higher degree of robustness of the estimates we also employed two other 
methods: the Feasible Generalized Least squares (FGLS) method and the PCSE method including country 
dummy variables to allow for fixed effects.  
First, we applied a modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity to check for any common 
variance in the panels. The test suggests that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity across panels should 
be rejected. The classic problem of country-specific heteroscedasticity is present in our time-series and the 
variance of the errors varies country by country.  
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Second, given common MENA-regional specific characteristics, it would be a too strong 
assumption that each cross section (country) is entirely independent of the others. Therefore, the error 
terms in den FDI equation are likely to include factors common to all MENA countries and thus to be 
correlated between cross section at a given time (for example a rise in oil price has an impact on all oil-
exporting nations). Indeed the residual correlation matrix of the 9 countries included in the sample shows 
considerable (high positive or negative) correlation among country residuals.ii As for autocorrelation, a 
test in panel-data models proposed by Wooldridge (2002) indicated the presence of serial correlation. 
Summing up, the results of the tests revealed that there is panel heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional 
correlation and a serial correlation of error terms in the sample. To take these into account we estimated a 
model using Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS, parks method) in which we combine a 
heteroscedastic error structure - allowing for country specific variance - with across-panel correlations, 
and with an AR(1) process where the correlation parameter rho is allowed to be unique for each country 
(this takes into account the country specifics) As the different rhos show, this is a better assumption than 
estimating a common AR(1). This method is suitable for our datasets, as the time dimension is greater 
than the cross-sectional dimension.  
Furthermore, we apply panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) esimates (Prais-Winsten 
regressions) with country level heteroscedasticity combined with a panel-specific AR(1) process. In 
addition, for all regressions we allowed the disturbances to be contemporaneously correlated across panels 
(each pair of panels has their own covariance). The reason for using the fixed effect panel data version of 
the Prais-Winsten estimator is that the FGLS standard error estimates may be over-optimistic (Beck and 
Katz, 1995).iii The estimated coefficients and standard errors are generally more conservative in the model 
estimated with OLS and panel-corrected standard error (PCSE). Our final estimates are reproduced in 
Table 5, Columns 1-3. Comparing the estimates of FGLS and PCSE, FGLS estimates indeed tend to be 
over optimistic, as the smaller standard errors show. But all of the results are quite robust to changes in 
model specification, suggesting that effects are more than artefacts’ of a statistical method. The key 
findings are independent of the FGLS/PCSE estimation methods. 
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Table 5          
Pooled regression results (1984-2006). The pooled regression model is      
 
 
 
         
          
          
          
          
          
          
  (1) (2) (3)      
    
OLS Fixed 
effects1 FGLS2 PCSE3      
    (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)      
GDPCG  0.012 0.005 0.003      
  (0.039) (0.011) (0.019)      
INFL  -0.020** -0.008** -0.014**      
  (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)      
TRADE  0.057*** 0.052*** 0.061***      
  (0.018) (0.008) (0.023)      
LABFE  0.010 0.000 0.027      
  (0.053) (0.033) (0.073)      
DEMO  0.554*** 0.333*** 0.468***      
  (0.170) (0.064) (0.155)      
CONFL  0.258*** 0.091** 0.194**      
  (0.092) (0.040) (0.080)      
CORRTAR3  -1.013*** -0.530*** -0.979***      
  (0.274) (0.149) (0.277)       
Constant  -6.297*** -0.408 -7.297***      
  (1.280) (0.989) 430)      
Observations  207 207 207      
No. of countries   9 9 9      
          
 
 
 
 
 
Regression Results and Interpretations 
 
Notes:  ***, **, * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; standard errors in parentheses.  
1  Panel regressions (OLS) with country fixed effects. 
2 Feasible generalized least square with country-specific effects (country dummies), 
 allowing for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation and panel specific error autocorrelation (AR1).  
3Prais-Winsten regression with panel corrected standard errors (corrected for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous  
correlation between panels and panel-specific AR1), with country-specific effects (country dummies).  
Country fixed effects are not reported.   
 
FDIit  = α + αi + ß1 GDPCG it-1  + ß2 INFL it-1  + ß3 TRADE it-1  + ß4 LABFE it-1  + ß5 DEMO it-1  
 + ß6 CONFL it-1 + ß7 CORRTAR3 it-1  +  εit  (i = 1,2, ….,9) and   (t = 1,2,…23)                             
where FDI is FDI net inflows (% of GDP), GDPCG is GDP per capia growth,     
inflation (INFL) is defined as percentage change in the GDO deflator or consumer price index,   
TRADE is the ratio of sum of exports and imports to GDP, LABFE ist Labor force, female (% of total labor force), DEMO is 
democratic accountability (0-6 scale), CONFL is external conflict (0-12 scale), and CORRTAR3 ("target level 3") is a measure 
of corruption. i refers to the countries and t refers to each year in the sample period. Independent variables are lagged one year. 
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The regression results in Table 5 provide a number of valuable insights.  
Note that the coefficients and standard error estimates from all three models are remarkably consistent. 
  H1: Economic variables. Hypothesis 1 established our prediction that economic variables have 
an impact on FDI. We expect that the larger the GDP of host countries are, the larger the FDI flow. In all 
models, GDP per capita growth has a positive sign, however the coefficient are not statistically significant. 
Further we hypothesized that higher inflation is associated with lower FDI flows. This hypothesis 
consistently received strong support, both in terms of the sign as well statistical significance, in all three 
models (Table 5, Models 1-3). There is no evidence of a direct relationship between economic growth 
(measured by GDP per capita growth) and FDI flows, while macroeconomic stability (inflation) is a 
significant determinant of FDI flows to the MENA region. 
H2: Openness of the economy. The hypothesis that the more open the economy is, the higher 
FDI is (H2) was strongly supported (p < 0.01) (Table 5, Models 1-3). Economic openness, measured by 
trade, is highly statistically significant positive correlated with FDI flows.   
H3: Education level and liberalism. We had hypothesized that in countries with higher 
education and liberal societies, the FDI will take more place. The results did not support the hypothesis. 
Labor force female participation, our proxy for educational liberalism, is not statistically significant, 
although the signs were in the right direction (Table 5, Models 1-3).  One reason for the insignificance 
might be that our proxy could not capture education and liberality of the countries adequately.  
H4: Governance and political stability. This hypothesis tested whether in countries with better 
governance and higher political stability the FDI flows are higher. The hypothesis was strongly supported 
and the coefficients for political risk were positive and statistically significant in all models (p < 0.01) 
(Table 5, Model 1-3). Political risk (democratic accountability) has a strong impact on FDI flows and 
clearly supports H4.   
H5: External conflicts. The hypothesis that countries with greater danger of conflicts (cross-
border conflicts to all-out war) will exhibit lower levels of FDI was supported (p < 0.01) (Table 5, Model 
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1), (p < 0.05) (Table 5, Model 2 and 3). The danger of external conflicts clearly rejects FDI.  Conflict and 
instability are significant barriers to foreign direct investment. 
H6: Corruption. Most importantly, it is shown that the level of corruption clearly matters in the 
MENA region. The risk indicator is strongly significant with the expected sign (p < 0.01) (Table 5, Model 
1-3). A high level of corruption is a barrier in generating FDI.  The results clearly argue in favor of 
hypothesis 6.  
Again, it is important to note, that the above results are robust with regard to model specification.  
In a capsule, the MENA world should focus more on reduction of political risk by doing all for 
keeping peace in the region, making democratic accountability more transparent and finally keeping 
inflation in check (which has a high variability going up to more than 50% for some countries) are strong 
prescriptions for attracting FDI to Arab countries. Corruption hurts and openness of the economy is very 
important. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
MENA countries are burdened by employment traditions and by a low stock of human capital. 
The weather, the local customs, the low participation of women in the labor force in many MENA 
countries, the lack of transparency, the level of corruption, and the inability of governments of oil 
producing countries to commit to an industrial diversification program that produces internationally 
competitive products have had serious effects on their ability to attract FDI.  There can be no doubt that a 
market of four hundred million people should not be ignored by global corporations. It has been.  MNC’s 
have serviced MENA countries through exports.  The typical consumer in those countries is very brand 
conscious and will sacrifice other consumptions and saving patterns to acquire a specific product. The 
exchange rate of all Arab countries is rigid in terms of the dollar or the euro. The successful Arab 
countries have little if any import taxes or quotas. A globally successful corporation can easily use the 
export option instead of FDI to reach the Arab markets. 
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This study has not been able to test every possible hypothesis given the data limitations.  We also 
have not been able to test for every MENA country because of data.  We ended up using panel data for 
nine Arab countries. The results speak of the relevance of the institutional factors: transparency of 
policies, degree of democracy, and the danger of conflicts and war in the region were important. Clearly, 
corruption has an impact on FDI. Trade and inflation are important explanatory variables. Arab countries 
need to heed these findings and to reduce corruption.  
The lack of integration in the Arab financial and product markets play a role in denying the Arab 
World its fair share of FDI. The market remains segmented with considerable differences between 
countries and regions. Unfortunately, we were not able to test for this. 
Many MENA countries, mostly Gulf countries, have been rather progressive in meeting the 
challenges of FDI.  But, the majority remains very regressive in many respects in creating a platform for 
FDI.  
It appears that many lessons could be drawn form the Chinese experience. The pace setting 
countries in the Arabian Gulf have had huge successes in creating good infrastructures for strong 
economic growth. They should serve as great examples for the rest of the MENA countries.   
Failing to attract FDI is not the end of development programs in MENA countries, many of which 
are currently flush with incredible wealth, the Gulf countries, especially. The huge dollar inflows into of 
2007 and 2008 should allow the generous funding of equity or venture capital funds to provide financial 
lifelines to start up companies in MENA countries, be they domestic or foreign.  This will help lay the 
foundation for stronger economic growth built on human capital and internationally competitive products, 
and will make FDI a much lower priority on the economic policy scale.            
      
NOTES 
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APPENDIX A 
Correlations between selected variables 
 FDI GDPCG INFL TRADE LABFE DEMO CONFL CORRTAR3 
FDI 1        
GDPCG 0.194 1       
INFL -0.0964 -0.0449 1      
TRADE 0.2733 0.1554 -0.417 1     
LABFE 0.1458 0.0546 0.1649 -0.1514 1    
DEMO 0.2912 0.0062 -0.1514 0.2681 0.0696 1   
CONFL 0.2306 0.1806 -0.209 0.3037 0.0913 0.1763 1  
CORRTAR3 -0.1502 -0.0532 -0.218 0.4326 -0.0908 0.3286 0.2355 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
FDI 207 1.546113 2.594744 -1.369183 22.83062 
GDPCG 207 1.54 4.312709 -16.51074 12.68869 
INFL 207 11.01941 21.29799 -20.6347 164.6251 
TRADE 207 68.14618 28.04717 12.96249 154.6453 
LABFE 207 24.58599 5.984385 13.2 40.5 
DEMO 207 2.362319 1.245041 0 5 
CONFL 207 8.917874 2.198415 3 12 
CORRTAR3 207 -0.4444444 0.7870651 -2 1 
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     APPENDIX B 
 The more recent literature on FDI is summarized in the following Table.  The last column shows 
some of the logical hypotheses that derive from the theories. It is clear that many of these hypotheses and 
their test results do not apply to the Arab world. Exchange rates, for example, could not explain any FDI 
flows.   
Theories Hypothesis Empirical Tests 
 Firm invests in other countries 
due to the presence of intangible 
assets. Difficult to appropriate 
rents from intangible assets 
through arrangements with an 
external party hence to internalize 
the rent (Internalization Theory) it 
sets up production affiliate. 
Transaction costs, OLI paradigm, 
Agency theory, hold-up issues.  
Difficult to observe 
the intangible 
assets. Proxy used 
– R&D 
expenditure, 
advertising 
intensity.  
1. Morck and Yeung (1992) 
found that publicly traded 
U.S. firms, announcing 
foreign acquisitions, 
experienced positive 
abnormal returns on their 
stock only if they had a 
significant level of R&D and 
advertising intensity. 
2. Kogut and Chang (1991) 
and Blonigen (1997) 
provide evidence that 
getting access to firm-
specific assets motivated 
Japanese firms’ acquisition 
FDI in the US.  
Exogenous and policy factors 
(Eclectic Theory: Partial 
Equilibrium) that affect the 
magnitude of FDI that we 
observe. For example, FDI is 
more likely to originate in 
countries abundant in capital 
and skilled-labor which are 
necessary for generating the 
firm-specific assets that create 
the need to internalize through 
FDI. 
These studies then 
typically examine 
how exogenous 
macroeconomic 
factors affect the 
firm’s FDI 
decision, with the 
primary focus on 
exchange rate 
movements, taxes, 
and to a more 
limited extent, 
tariffs. 
 
 
Exchange rates -- Until Froot and 
Stein (1991), the belief was that 
changes in the level of exchange 
rate shouldn’t change FDI 
decision. Due to depreciation in 
home currency the assets abroad 
Exchange rate 
effects -- The effect 
of exchange rates 
on FDI has been 
examined both with 
respect to changes 
1. Froot and Stein (1991) gives 
evidence of increased inward 
FDI with currency 
depreciation. 
2. Klein and Rosengren (1994), 
confirms that exchange rate 
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will be more expensive and 
simultaneously the profits will be 
valued more leaving the return 
unchanged. However -- 
1. Froot and Stein (1991) 
came up with an 
imperfect capital market 
story which says that 
internal cost of capital is 
lower than external 
borrowing and hence 
exchange rate movements 
is negatively correlated 
with FDI, i.e. 
appreciation of home 
currency leads to more 
FDI in the foreign 
country 
2. Blonigen (1997) argues 
that if there are 
transferable assets 
within a firm that don’t 
need monetary 
transactions (e.g. 
technology, skills) then 
an appreciation of 
foreign currency leads 
to a ‘fire sale’ of those 
assets from the 
domestic country 
leading to an outward 
flow of FDI. 
3. The financial crises of the 
late 1990s, led to the 
hypothesis that large 
exchange rate swings 
tend to affect FDI. 
4. Uncertainty about future 
exchange rate movements 
may affect FDI decisions. 
 
 
in the bilateral level 
of the exchange 
rate between 
countries and in the 
volatility of 
exchange rates. 
depreciation increases US 
FDI.  
3. Blonigen (1997) finds strong 
support of increased inward 
US acquisition FDI by 
Japanese firms in response to 
real dollar depreciations, 
specially for high technology 
industries. 
4. Desai, Foley and Forbes 
(2004) argues that MNEs 
have a greater ability to 
finance investment 
internally than local firms, 
hence in case of a 
currency crisis U.S. foreign 
affiliates increase their 
investment, sales and 
assets significantly more 
than local firms. 
5. Lipsey (2001) studies U.S. 
FDI into three regions as 
they experienced currency 
crises (Latin America in 
1982, Mexico in 1994, and 
East Asia in 1997) He finds 
that FDI flows are relatively 
stable than other flows of 
capital. 
6. Campa (1993) uncertainty 
affects FDI based on real 
options theory of Dixit 
(1989). Greater exchange 
rate uncertainty increases 
the option for firms to wait 
until investing in a market, 
depressing current FDI. 
Tomlin (2000) points out 
that the Campa (1993) 
estimates are sensitive to 
empirical specification.  
7. Goldberg and Kolstad 
(1995) alternatively 
hypothesizes that 
exchange rate uncertainty 
will in fact increase FDI by 
risk averse MNEs if such 
uncertainty is correlated 
with export demand shocks 
in the markets they intend 
to serve.  
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Taxes –  
The effects of taxes on FDI 
can vary substantially by type 
of taxes, measurement of FDI 
activity, and tax treatment in 
the host and parent countries. 
Earnings by an affiliate in 
foreign country will ultimately 
be subject to dual taxes in 
both the parent and the host 
country regardless of whether 
it is repatriated or reinvested in 
the foreign affiliate. New 
investment decisions consider 
transfers of new capital from 
the parent to the affiliate that 
do not incur taxes in the host 
country. This means that firms 
will want to finance new FDI 
through retained earnings as 
much as possible, before 
turning to new infusions from 
the parent, and FDI through 
new transfers of capital, on the 
other hand, will potentially 
respond to both parent and 
host country taxes and rates of 
return available in both 
countries. 
 
 
Higher taxes 
discourage FDI. 
 
 
1. De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2003) found a median tax-
elasticity of FDI of -3.3 
across 25 studies. 
2. Hartman (1984) finds that 
retained earnings FDI 
responds significantly to 
the host country tax rate as 
hypothesized. Transfer 
FDI, however, does not 
respond significantly to 
host country tax rates. 
3. Slemrod (1990) gets mixed 
results revealing an 
insignificant tax response 
for retained earnings FDI.  
 
 
Institutions – 
Poor legal protection of assets 
increases the chance of 
expropriation of a firm’s assets 
making investment risky. Poor 
quality of institutions 
necessary increases the cost 
of doing business thus 
decreasing profit margin and 
ultimately discourages FDI.  
 
While these basic 
hypotheses are non-
controversial, 
empirically testing 
the hypothesis is 
difficult. Most 
measures are 
developed from 
survey responses 
from officials or 
businessmen 
familiar with the 
country. Hence 
cross-country 
comparison is 
inaccurate. Also, as 
 
1. Wei (2000a; 2000b) show that 
a variety of corruption indices 
are strongly and negatively 
correlated with FDI. 
2. Hines (1995) provides an 
interesting “natural 
experiment” approach by 
examining how the 1977 U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
which penalized U.S. 
multinational firms for 
bribing foreign officials, 
affected FDI inflow 
negatively. 
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institutions are 
stable overtime any 
time wise affect is 
negligible as well. 
 
Trade protection – 
Though fairly simple this theory 
is mainly restrictive due to data 
availability. No uniform measure 
of on-tariff trade barriers exists 
and hence cross-country 
comparison is difficult.  
 
Higher trade 
protection should 
make firms more 
likely to substitute 
affiliate production 
for exports to avoid 
the costs of trade 
production – alias 
‘tariff-jumping 
FDI’. 
 
 
1. Belderbos (1997) and 
Blonigen (2002) both found 
robust evidence of tariff-
jumping FDI. 
2. Blonigen and Figlio (1998) 
finds evidence that an 
increase in FDI into a U.S. 
Senator’s state or U.S. 
house representative’s 
district increases their 
likelihood to vote for further 
trade protection 
 
Trade Effects – 
FDI, with high fixed costs and 
low variable cost, is a substitute 
of exports, which have high 
variable cost, low fixed costs and 
trade barriers. Hence, only after 
the target market has reached a 
discernable size will benefits from 
FDI supercede that from exports. 
 
Blonigen (2001) 
considers the issue 
that trade flows 
may be either 
finished products or 
intermediate inputs 
The former 
situation would 
suggest a negative 
correlation between 
“trade” and “FDI”, 
whereas the latter 
would suggest a 
positive association 
between the two. 
1. Lipsey and Weiss (1981) 
found a positive relationship 
between FDI and exports 
which is inconsistent with the 
theory. 
2. Blonigen (2001) show that 
new FDI in the US by 
Japanese firms increases 
Japanese exports of related 
intermediate inputs for these 
products, whereas new FDI 
leads to declines in Japanese 
exports of the same finished 
products. Head and Ries 
(2001) and Swenson (2004) 
show similar evidence. 
 
General Equilibrium Models 
The problem with partial 
equilibrium models is that they 
ignore the important long-term 
factors that affect FDI. This can 
lead to omitted variable bias in 
empirical estimation. 
 
The Gravity Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specifies trade 
flows between 
countries as 
primarily a 
function of the 
GDP of each 
country and the 
distance between 
the two countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) that lays out a 
tractable model that 
specifically identifies gravity 
variables as the sole 
determinants of FDI patterns 
2. Markusen (1984) and 
Helpman (1984), MNE 
general equilibrium theory 
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 suggested two distinct 
motivations for FDI: a) to 
access markets in the face of 
trade frictions (horizontal 
FDI) and b) to access low 
wages for part of the 
production process (vertical 
FDI). 
3. Export platform FDI 
(Ekholm, Forslid, and 
Markusen, 2003, and 
Bergstrand and Egger, 
2004) suggests that a MNE 
invests into a host country 
to use it as a production 
platform for exports to a 
group of neighboring  
countries. 
4. Baltagi, Egger and 
Pfaffermayr, (2007) 
explored a vertical 
interaction where affiliates 
of an MNE in a variety of 
hosts are shipping 
intermediate goods 
between them for further 
processing before final 
shipping of the finished 
product back to the parent. 
 
 
Knowledge-capital model 
 
 
 
 
FDI is a function of 
“skill differences”. 
 
1. Carr, Markusen and Maskus 
(2001) found affiliate sales in 
a host country is a function of 
GDP of the two countries, 
trade costs of the two 
countries, FDI costs, and 
differences in factor 
endowments. 
2. Hanson, Mataloni, and 
Slaughter (2003) and 
Feinberg and Keane 
(2001; 2003) finds 
substantial vertical activity 
for certain manufacturing 
sectors (machinery and 
electronics) and host 
countries. 
 
Spatial Dependence 
 
A vertical FDI 
decision by an 
1. Coughlin and Segev (2000) 
found that FDI into 
  35 
MNE involves 
picking the “best” 
low-cost host at 
the expense of 
other potential host 
locations. An 
export platform 
strategy likewise 
involves picking 
the “best” host 
country and 
presumably 
leaving 
“neighbors” out.  
 
neighboring provinces 
increases FDI into a Chinese 
province. 
2. Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, 
and Naughton (2004) 
estimate a negative effect 
of neighboring-country FDI 
on the amount of US FDI 
received by a European 
country, while finding that 
neighboring GDPs 
increase FDI. 
3. Baltagi, Egger, and 
Pfaffermayr (2007) predicts 
how a variety of neighboring 
country characteristics (GDP, 
trade costs, endowments, etc.) 
should affect FDI into a focus 
country conditional to MNE 
motivations (horizontal, 
vertical, export-platform, 
etc.).  
 
Source: Based on the paper of A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI 
Determinants, Bruce A. Blonigen, University of Oregon and NBER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  36 
                                                 
i Hausman specification tests do not support the use of random effects 
ii The Breusch-Pagan test indicates that the contemporaneous correlation between the error terms of each 
equation is highly significant. 
iii FGLS produces overconfident test statistics especially when the number of groups is large relative to 
the number of years in the sample. This is not the case in our sample (number of groups: 9, number of 
years 23). 
